What Azerbaijan gains from joining Abraham Accords: benefits and geopolitical risks

Since 2020, the Abraham Accords, initiated under US mediation as a series of agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, have begun to extend well beyond their original regional scope. The initial intention was to restore relations between Israel and the Gulf states, as well as several Arab countries, after decades of hostility, and to promote cultural and economic cooperation. However, in the context of the Palestinian issue, this process has in recent times, generated serious discontent in Iran and a number of Muslim-majority states across the region.

It is therefore no coincidence that, following the Trump administration’s return to leadership in the United States, the White House has put forward Azerbaijan’s potential accession to the agreement as a proposal. Although Azerbaijan belongs neither to the Middle East nor to the Arab world, the nature of Israel–Azerbaijan relations, coupled with Tel Aviv’s strategic approach to the South Caucasus, creates conditions under which Baku’s inclusion in this framework has become a realistic possibility.

Supporters argue that joining the Abraham Accords would merely formalise what already exists. Azerbaijan and Israel maintain one of the closest strategic partnerships in the broader Middle East–Caspian region, encompassing defence and intelligence cooperation, energy trade, technology and innovation ties.

From this perspective, accession would not represent a radical policy shift, but rather the institutionalisation of a long-standing, pragmatic partnership under a recognised multilateral framework supported by the United States.
Another positive argument is that accession would serve as a strong geopolitical signal, such as reaffirming Azerbaijan’s role as a constructive, stability-oriented actor, strengthening ties with the US political and security establishment, and increasing Azerbaijan’s diplomatic visibility beyond the post-Soviet and South Caucasus space. Put simply, in an era of intensifying great-power competition, proponents see the Accords as a platform through which Azerbaijan could diversify its strategic partnerships without formal alliance commitments.

From the perspective of the Abraham Accords, their economic rationale also appears to have proven its value. If one examines the internal logic of the agreement, Azerbaijan’s formal participation would create opportunities to gain access, alongside Israel, to investment networks linked to the Gulf and the United States, as well as to cooperation with the countries concerned in such fields as agriculture, water management, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and defence technologies. It would also open pathways to emerging trade routes and logistics corridors connecting the Eastern Mediterranean, the Gulf, and Europe. In this sense, the Abraham Accords go beyond a narrow peace agenda, functioning instead as a geo-economic ecosystem that forges connective links between regions.

At the same time, under current conditions, certain risks also come into play. The existing closeness in Azerbaijan–Israel relations has, in many cases, both irritated and unnecessarily unsettled neighbouring Iran. In some instances, economic interests are perceived in Tehran less as commercial opportunities and more as geostrategic risks, which in turn contributes to an atmosphere of tension in the South Caucasus. Moreover, Azerbaijan places a premium on maintaining balanced relations with countries that are members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, as well as the Non-Aligned Movement. Because joining the Accords could be interpreted, fairly or not, as Azerbaijan taking sides in Middle Eastern fault lines, especially at a time of heightened Israel–Palestine and Iran–Israel tensions. From this view, Baku gains little by voluntarily importing geopolitical baggage from another region.

Despite all this, as a South Caucasus country Azerbaijan is actively involved in a range of initiatives aimed at building economic ties with both Israel and Arab states. In particular, in the field of energy (both green and conventional) it has taken a number of successful steps in cooperation with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and even Syria, which is entering a new phase. All of this indicates that, whether within the framework of the agreements or outside them, Azerbaijan attaches particular importance to the development of political, economic, and cultural relations.

As regards the Abraham Accords, which are rapidly expanding in scope, they harbour ambitions not only to encompass the South Caucasus but also Central Asia. This suggests that the United States and Israel intend in the near future to move beyond a conflict-centred agenda and prioritise the preservation of economic balance. The current environment, however, is rather different: tensions surrounding Iran, the unresolved Palestinian crisis, and instability in the Middle East continue to cast a shadow over confidence in the future.