Q1: Azerbaijan has signed a two-year individual partnership action plan with NATO in 2008. What do you see as a logical continuation of this plan in 2010: the extension of the existing format, or an invitation to begin the process of so-called Intensified Dialogue with the Alliance?
A: Azerbaijan is a very close and active partner of the Alliance and I am pleased with the strong relationship that we have. The Individual Partnership Action Plan, which you referred to, was first agreed in 2005 and updated in 2008. It contains a wide-ranging programme of domestic reforms, as well as concrete measures for practical cooperation and political dialogue in support of these reforms. It also aims at strengthening the overall ties between Azerbaijan and NATO. But the Individual Partnership Action Plan is not aimed at Azerbaijan’s membership in the Alliance. And this means that there is no logical progression from the Individual Partnership Action Plan to programmes that are specifically tailored to membership aspirants, such as the Intensified Dialogue.
Q2: The Heads of State and Government in the final declaration of this year’s April Summit meeting in Strasbourg - Kehl, expressed their support for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, as well as support for the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts in the former Soviet Union countries, based on the abovementioned principles. How do you see the prospects for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict? What is the role of NATO in this process with the OSCE Minsk Group leading the negotiations?
A: NATO is indeed very concerned with the conflicts in the South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova. It is vital that these conflicts be resolved peacefully and within a reasonable timeframe. Regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, I very much welcome and support the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group to assist Armenia and Azerbaijan to find a settlement to this conflict. Recently, these efforts have gathered momentum and I hope that we will see further progress. NATO will not play a role of its own in the mediation, but we will use our political dialogue with both parties to promote a peaceful solution to the conflict.
Q3: It is probably a bit early to ask this question, but, do you consider possible participation of NATO forces in a possible peacekeeping operation in Karabakh? And how would you comment on the experts' opinion that the presence of NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo served as a guarantee of recognition of the region’s independence in view of obvious opposition from Serbia and Russia?
A: On the first issue, you are absolutely correct: it would be hypothetical to address the question of a possible NATO role in peacekeeping in Nagorno-Karabakh, and I do not believe it would be useful to engage in any speculation on this topic at this time. As for Kosovo, I would caution against generalizations and attempts to apply the unique circumstances of Kosovo to other conflicts or regions of the world. NATO’s task to provide a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, which is mandated by the United Nations Security Council, is distinct from the question of Kosovo’s status. This is well illustrated by the fact that, in addition to nations that recognise Kosovo’s independence, nations that do not recognise Kosovo’s independence contribute forces to KFOR as well.
Q4: How difficult is it to show solidarity with Georgia and at the same time work towards restoring ties with Russia? Do you think these are mutually interrelated processes or vice versa?
A: I see no contradiction in advancing NATO’s cooperation with Russia while at the same time continuing to build strong relations with our other partners. NATO seeks a constructive relationship with Russia and I have recently made some concrete proposals on how to take our cooperation forward. But this does not mean that we will ignore the existing disagreements between NATO and Russia. Our view remains unchanged on several fundamental issues, such as NATO’s strong support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and our position on Georgia’s membership aspirations. The important point is that these disagreements must not prevent NATO and Russia from cooperating in areas where our interests coincide, for example on enhancing stability in Afghanistan and on fighting terrorism.
Q5: According to Armenian experts, for many years, the continuing refusal of Turkey, a NATO member, to normalize relations with Armenia was a serious obstacle to the development of Armenia's cooperation with NATO. Do you consider the Switzerland-brokered start of normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia as a "window of opportunity" for the Alliance and Armenia to intensify co-operation bearing in mind that Armenia's membership in the organization of collective security of CIS countries?
A: It is not true, that the difficulties that Turkey and Armenia have had in their bilateral relationship constituted, as you say, a “serious obstacle” to the development of NATO-Armenia relations in the past. Armenia has been a member of the Partnership for Peace since 1994 and NATO-Armenia relations have been developing dynamically for a considerable period of time now. So I do not think, that there is a direct link between the two processes.
That said, I welcome the recent agreement signed between Turkey and Armenia. I am confident, that the current efforts by Armenia and Turkey to normalize their relations can have a beneficial effect not only on the further development of NATO’s ties with Armenia, but also on regional security as a whole.
Q6: Energy security issues have been always in the centre of attention of the Alliance. What are the main risks and challenges that the Alliance is facing in ensuring energy security? What steps have been taken by the Alliance, conserning cooperation with the countries of the region, to ensure the security of energy routes and pipelines? What is NATO's position on the Nabucco project?
A: It is clear, that a reliable and stable energy supply is of critical importance to the security of the Alliance. Diversification of routes, suppliers and energy sources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks are all factors that can enhance energy security. I see the Nabucco pipeline project in this context, and I believe it is potentially a very positive project. At the same time, we should be clear that Nabucco is not a NATO project and I think that we should refrain from overly politicizing it. As for NATO’s own work on energy security, we focus our efforts on those areas where we can add the most value. This means, for example, that we use our extensive cooperation with partner countries in defense and security sector reform to help strengthen countries’ ability to protect their own critical infrastructure. This may not always be very visible, but it is effective, and I think it has already made a contribution to the security of energy infrastructure in the region.
Q7: United States decided to suspend construction of missile defense sites in the Czech Republic and Poland. What do you think about this, especially in light of the declaration of the summit (Para 54)? What would be the NATO's position on the joint use of Gabala radar station, located on the territory of Azerbaijan?
A: NATO leaders have repeatedly emphasized, that missile proliferation poses an increasing threat and that missile defense is part of a broader response to that threat. So I welcome the fact that the United States in the framework of NATO is discussing how we can develop missile defenses, which, can include all Allies and protect all Allies. The question of the use of the Gabala station in Azerbaijan has arisen much earlier because of a proposal by the Russian Federation. I have said before, that I believe it makes sense, at an appropriate time, to think about linking NATO, US, and Russian systems but it is too early to talk about specific sites.
Q8: Your predecessor had a direct view & understanding of the state of affairs in the region because he extensively travelled to the region in his capacity of the OSCE chairman-in-Office, in 2003. Do you plan to visit the region in the near future?
A: Of course I will travel to the region, but firm dates have not been established yet. You may imagine that this early on in my term as Secretary General there are many demands on my time and my travel schedule is intense. But I do hope to be able to visit the region as soon as is feasible.
U. Amirbayov
Day.Az
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