Turkey-Armenia: Too steep for “zero-problems with neighbors” theory

By Adil Baguirov

As a rule, the art of successful politics and diplomacy, whose fundamental objective is to resolve problems, always aims to improve the ranking and position of a nation-state when there is a seeming balance, to preserve the status quo if someone is trying to change that balance or to do damage-control and stall the decline brought by forces outside its control for as long as possible. However, the aim is never to worsen the country’s short-, medium- and long-term posture, goals and objectives – what is sometimes referred to as the national interest of the state. Regrettably at the moment, it seems to be the case that Turkey’s policy of “zero-problems with neighbors,” has resulted in the worsening of its geostrategic stance in the south Caucasus and Caspian regions.

Conceptually, the notion of “zero-problems with neighbors” is a highly appealing and welcoming academic theory. The reality, sadly, differs, as there is no real precedent in the history of international relations for any one country to rapidly improve relations and resolve several sizeable problems in a short, compressed time-frame. While it is true that the world, especially the Greater Middle East, has had centuries to work out its still unresolved problems, that necessitates fresh theoretical approaches. Moreover, these new methods should not undermine, fracture or spoil something that works and has been cherished and built for previous generations. As a famous Russian proverb says, it is better to have a smaller bird in hand, than a bigger bird in the sky. Primum non nocere – do no harm.

While everyone in the Turkish government understands the supreme importance of a special and strategic relationship with the biggest and most important country in the south Caucasus region, fraternal Azerbaijan – including the architect of the “zero-problems” theory, cabinet minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who cites this Turkic country repeatedly in his book – it seems that the latest series of setbacks are the result of unclear communication, insufficient consultations, outright insensitivities and poor calculations. It did not have to be so – after all, the ambitious undertaking by the Turkish government could have been clearer and far more successful. After all, the end goals of the two states, are one and the same – peace, prosperity and development.

The “zero-problems” policy’s scorecard remains a mixed bag of advances and frustrating setbacks. Guided by the new policy, Turkey has achieved some great successes, such as the resolution of the PKK terrorism, improving relations with the Arab world and historic nemesis Iran, repairing relations with the U.S., as well as a new, unprecedented strategic relationship with Russia that has brought a flood of important energy megaprojects. Turkey has also legitimized itself as a permanent actor and acceptable broker in the affairs of the south Caucasus. However, the list of setbacks and potential failures are no less thought-provoking: One can point to the Cyprus issue, EU accession being as far away as ever, worsening relations with Georgia, problems with Israel and the Jewish lobby, the recruitment of an increasing number of co-sponsors in an anti-Turkish resolution from the U.S. Congress by the Armenian lobby (i.e., “business as usual”). In addition to these, it is necessary to mention the rift with Azerbaijan over the worsened prospects of an Armenian military withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent regions due to the Armenian calculation that it can now prolong occupation and get a better deal once the land border with Turkey is open. That is the crux of Azerbaijan’s frustration with the symbolism of the opening of the border before Armenia commits to a withdrawal from Karabakh. The Armenian government and the diaspora view it in zero-sum terms, while Turkey quixotically attempts to achieve a positive-sum result.

If Turkey’s gambit will result in long-term cooling of relations with not just Azerbaijan, but the Azerbaijani people, and by association, with the rest of the Turkic world in Central Asia – who are watching how all this plays out and will make their determination – it would be the equivalent of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, government shooting itself in the foot. It does not make much economic or geographical sense to essentially trade the interests of a fraternal nation that fought alongside the Turkish people – even in Gallipoli in 1915 – and with whom Turkey enjoys almost $3 billion in growing trade turnover and a geopolitical renaissance due to the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum pipelines for a much smaller and inherently hostile nation with only about $200 million in trade turnover with bleak prospects.

Even though this is not the aim of Turkish calculations, it is how it appears to many, especially after such examples of insensitivity like the allowance of the flag of separatist Karabakh during the football match in Yerevan, but the public interdiction, and subsequent disrespect, of the Azerbaijani flag during the match in Bursa (it should be noted that several oversized Turkish flags were present at the Azerbaijan-Russia game that same day in Baku).

One should not forget either the unprecedented special cooking by the First Lady of Turkey for the Armenian President, who admitted culpability for the single biggest tragedy in Karabakh, the Khojaly Massacre of 1992, when hundreds of Azerbaijani civilians were violently killed overnight.

The reality of a multi-polar world is that Turkey’s goodwill and attempt to help resolve regional problems could result in potentially embarrassing failures, like it did on the Cyprus issue. Neither U.S. President Barack Obama and his government nor President Sarkisian in Armenia can prevent or completely stop the Armenian lobby’s determination to push forward their very raison d’être. Likewise, EU bureaucrats will be unable to convince all member nations that Turkey deserves to become a full fledged member of that union.

Armenia, meanwhile, will be unable to generate even 10% of trade benefits with Azerbaijan. However, Azerbaijan, and, importantly, its people, can turn back, and with them close the Turkish bridge to the other Turkic nations of Central Asia. At the moment, it seems that Turkish government is still confident it can pull this gambit off, and could be guided by the famous words of the grand strategist Metternich: “Diplomacy is the art of avoiding the appearance of victory.

The article was published in 'Huriyyet Daily News.'

* Ms. Adil Baguirov is the founding member of the Azerbaijan Turkey Historical Research Foundation (ATAF), co-founder of the U.S. Turkic Network (USTN) and is a post-doctoral fellow at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO).