Armenia’s strategic pivot: Why Yerevan quietly embracing TRIPP Corridor [ANALYSIS]

For years, the idea of an East–West transport artery running through the currently southern Armenian province of Syunik, known in Azerbaijan as the Zangazur Corridor and in Armenia increasingly referenced under the more neutral “TRIPP” framework, was treated in Yerevan as political heresy. Yet over the last several months, there has been a striking shift in tone. Armenia, once vehemently opposed to any discussion of a land link connecting mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan, is now signalling pragmatic openness. The recent meeting between the economy ministers of Armenia and Turkiye, the first of its kind in years, marks not merely a diplomatic thaw but a recalibration of Armenia’s strategic outlook.

This change is not happening in a vacuum. Faced with geopolitical isolation, diminished military leverage, and a critical need for economic diversification, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan appears increasingly determined to break from the security paradigms that defined Armenia’s post-Soviet trajectory. His government’s growing interest in opening the TRIPP route is one of the clearest manifestations of that shift.

Nevertheless, Armenia's political discourse around the TRIPP, Trans-Regional International Project for Peace, has evolved remarkably fast. Although the term “Zangazur Corridor” remains politically sensitive in Yerevan, the underlying logic of re-establishing regional transport connectivity is gaining traction. The meeting between the Armenian and Turkish economy ministers underscored this trend; the discussions reportedly focused on trade, logistics and long-term economic cooperation, all of which are impossible to advance meaningfully without improved East–West transit routes through Armenia.

In other words, even if Armenian officials refrain from using Baku’s terminology, they are increasingly acknowledging that a functional, internationally-guaranteed transit passage through Syunik is not only inevitable but potentially beneficial.

The arguments supporting this policy shift are economic as much as political. Armenia’s limited access to global markets, dependence on the Georgian route, and frozen diplomatic relations with two of its four neighbours have long constrained its development. A transit link facilitating regional integration could generate transit revenues, attract investment, and reduce Armenia’s near-total reliance on Russian logistical and energy infrastructure.

Here we observe a new strategic move, such as Pashinyan’s pivot to Central Asia...

Alongside this emerging openness to connectivity lies this significant development: Pashinyan’s active courtship of Central Asia. Kazakhstan, in particular, has become a key diplomatic target. Yerevan sees Astana not only as a major regional actor within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) but also as a gateway to broader trade networks across Central Asia and China.

In recent months, Armenia has intensified political and economic engagement with Kazakhstan, signalling a desire to diversify partnerships away from Moscow. High-level visits, expanding trade missions, and public rhetoric about “a new Eurasian engagement” demonstrate Pashinyan’s intent to cultivate alternative strategic anchors.

Armenia’s view is that Kazakhstan’s role in regional logistics, its balancing diplomacy, and its large economy can serve as a counterweight to Russia’s declining reliability. This is especially relevant as Armenia deepens its security cooperation with the West and pursues a measured distancing from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).

Ultimately, Pashinyan’s outreach to Kazakhstan is part of a broader attempt to reposition Armenia within a post-Ukraine-war Eurasian landscape, where Russia’s grip is weakening, Turkiye’s influence is rising, and China’s Belt and Road remains a central economic force.

Azerbaijan–Armenia peace track: Fragile but moving forward

Armenia’s policy diversification coincides with significant movement on the Azerbaijan–Armenia peace process. After years of stalemate, Baku and Yerevan are finally edging towards a long-awaited peace treaty. The latest bilateral statements suggest that the remaining disagreements, while serious, are not insurmountable.

Border delimitation commissions have continued meeting; discussions on unblocking regional transport links have gained momentum; and both sides have publicly reiterated their readiness to sign a treaty based on mutual recognition of territorial integrity.

The TRIPP corridor is central to this process. For Azerbaijan, a guaranteed land link to Nakhchivan is a strategic imperative and one of the key conditions for sustainable peace. For Armenia, agreeing to such a link, under its jurisdiction and international law, offers the possibility of unlocking economic opportunities and securing Western political support.

Crucially, the geopolitical environment is exerting pressure on Armenia to reach a settlement. With Russia increasingly preoccupied in Ukraine and unable or unwilling to act as a guarantor for Yerevan, the Armenian leadership recognises that an agreement with Azerbaijan is necessary to stabilise its borders and unlock future development trajectories.

However, opponents of Pashinyan’s government inside Armenia accuse him of capitulation. Yet the shift towards cooperation on transit routes and the warming of ties with Turkiye, Kazakhstan, and other regional actors is not capitulation but strategic adaptation. Armenia simply cannot afford isolation. Its economy is too small, its geography too restrictive, and its security guarantees too fragile to withstand another decade of closed borders and geopolitical antagonism.

Opening the TRIPP route and, by extension, normalising relations with Turkiye and Azerbaijan, is perhaps Armenia’s only viable path towards long-term stability.

Given the current situation, the corridor could be designated more like a litmus test for peace. So it means that Armenia’s growing interest in the TRIPP corridor is a telling indicator of the country’s pragmatic turn. Combined with Pashinyan’s outreach to Central Asia and the cautiously advancing peace negotiations with Azerbaijan, it signals a future in which the South Caucasus could finally shift from confrontation to connectivity.

Whether this transformation succeeds will depend on political will, regional trust, and the leaders’ ability to overcome decades of mistrust. But for the first time in years, the pieces are beginning to align.