Pashinyan showed the wrong side of the Karabakh negotiations: there is no sensation for us, it is a shock for the Armenians

Nikol Pashinyan did it. He has long promised his "former" opponents to publish documents on the so-called peace process for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. And finally, he fulfilled his promise.

By publishing these documents, the Armenian Prime Minister wanted to destroy the myths created by Kocharyan and Sargsyan that they had been fighting to the death for the principle of "not an inch of land" all the years of negotiations, but Pashinyan surrendered the lands that the Armenians had so hard won after the First Karabakh War. Pashinyan, responding to the accusations, threatened to publish documents that clearly show that all the years Ter-Petrosyan, Kocharyan, and then Sargsyan discussed at the table the principles that prescribed the return of territories to Azerbaijan and other conditions that appeared in the Trilateral Statement of November 10, 2020, signed by Nikol Pashinyan.

The Armenian prime minister wanted to show that nothing new had happened, and he did what any of the "former" ones would have done if Baku had been satisfied with the terms of those previous agreements. But Baku was not satisfied with them, and in the end, the burden of responsibility was shifted by the "exes" to Pashinyan, who simply had no way out after losing the war.

Let's say right away that there is nothing unexpected in these publications for us. The texts of the settlement principles developed have never been a secret in Azerbaijan. Except that it's a slander put up by Putin. Everything contained in these documents has been known for all the years of negotiations. We knew perfectly well that the Armenian side wanted to keep Kalbajar and Lachin, that it was fighting for an illegal referendum, demanding guarantees and other pleasures. And the Armenian society, apparently, has always been deceived by its leaders, so the "revelations" that were published became a sensation for our neighbors.

So, among the documents, Pashinyan issued the text of the well-known UN Security Council resolution, which recognizes the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and requires the withdrawal of Armenian forces from all occupied territories. For what? Firstly, to show that Ter-Petrosyan failed diplomacy by allowing the adoption of such resolutions. And secondly, so that former presidents would not have the opportunity to create illusions among the Armenian society regarding the recognition of the status quo by the world following the results of the first war. In fact, the whole world recognized (or was forced to recognize) the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. And Kocharyan and Sargsyan, I remember, convinced their flock that the world recognizes the integrity of Azerbaijan without Karabakh. Unfortunately, those Security Council resolutions remained the only documents of this level where the occupier was called an occupier.

The settlement principles developed by the Minsk Group Co-Chairs have never served Azerbaijan's interests. The purpose of the peace process itself was to persuade Baku to accept the loss of territories. But according to the published texts, one can see how the Armenian side maneuvered, trying to wrest the notorious status for the separatists, from which it will be possible to dance later.

Once again, we were well aware of the principles of the settlement proposed to Azerbaijan. It doesn't matter what has been discussed for a quarter of a century. The main thing is that all this has remained on paper and in Armenian dreams. Otherwise, you and I wouldn't be sitting here writing all this right now. History would have flowed in a completely different direction.

Baku could not refuse meetings and discussions, although they did not give a fair result. Failure to negotiate would be ambiguously perceived by the international community. This would worsen the situation of the country, which is already surrounded by Armenia's allies and other interested parties. In such a situation, Baku chose the most correct tactics. He did not reject the formula proposed to him for renouncing territories, but he did not agree to it either. Let's recall the conversations about the exchange of territories that took place in the 90s. Yes, national leader Heydar Aliyev had these discussions with Kocharyan. But not because he was going to give up Karabakh. It was a very clever maneuver that led the middlemen into a maze. While they were looking for a way out of it, the topic of exchanging Karabakh for Meghri disappeared by itself. Karabakh criminal Robert Kocharyan still recalls that situation in his interviews, but he cannot explain why the discussions stopped. And they stopped because Baku no longer needed it. Azerbaijan was already starting to get back on its feet, and the issue of the return of all territories was firmly on the state's agenda. This is called proper diplomacy, if anything.

The formula 5+2 did not suit Azerbaijan from the very beginning. But, again, according to a well-thought-out tactic, he did not reject her, but he did not accept her either. Baku was not going to leave anything to the enemy and was aimed at liberating all territories. He was stalling for time, allowing the enemy to entertain empty hopes, and the intermediaries to think that they would succeed.

Pashinyan posted documents stating in black and white that his opponents, who accuse the prime minister of "surrendering" territories, have been discussing this "surrender" themselves for many years. Kocharyan and Sargsyan were ready to return five districts and gradually withdraw troops from the remaining two, with the exception of the Lachin road. Azerbaijan liberated four of the seven occupied regions around Karabakh itself, while Pashinyan pledged to return the remaining three as soon as possible. And returned it. What choice did he have?

The only thing that Pashinyan could not convince his opponents of was that his predecessors had been discussing all the years about leaving Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. The documents he published did not confirm this. And they couldn't confirm it. Everyone knew that the negotiation process did not consider such a prospect at all. Only at the very beginning it was about self-determination within Azerbaijan, and later, at the request of the Armenian side, there was talk of a "transitional status" and a "referendum."

What do we learn from Serzh Sargsyan's slander to Vladimir Putin, sent in August 2016? We learn that Baku has abandoned the Madrid principles, which have been worked on for almost ten years. There is even fear in the text of the slur. The April fighting scared Yerevan very much, who expected that the mediators would put the squeeze on Baku and force him to sign the document needed by the occupier. The Karabakh criminal, pityingly addressing Putin, calls him to witness some agreements, asks him to threaten recognition of Karabakh from neighboring countries if Azerbaijan does not fulfill any obligations there, and tries to demonstrate its loyalty in this way.

It's very funny. Especially, let's repeat, in the light of the April fighting that shocked Armenia, and not only it. After 2016, few people had any doubts about the inevitability of war. In the following years, the mediators continued to portray vigorous activity, but the same principles were on the table that were unacceptable to Azerbaijan. With minor edits and some comments. There was no point in those papers anymore.

To be honest, it is surprising that for someone in Azerbaijan, what they saw in the files published by Pashinyan was a revelation. Apparently, these bloggers and users did not follow the process due to their age or for other reasons. People always try to look for some kind of second bottom, to look behind the scenes, hoping to see what they haven't been shown. In politics, a lot of things are hidden from view. But in terms of the peace process around the Karabakh conflict as a whole, there is nothing that could be striking. In this case, it's about us, not our neighbors.

The summit in Kazan, which Sargsyan mentioned in the slur, took place in June 2011, and international mediators and Armenia were very actively preparing for it, hoping to put the squeeze on the situation and force Baku to sign up to serious concessions to the Armenian side and the actual loss of Karabakh. But President Ilham Aliyev disappointed everyone by making ten amendments to the text. The document from 2011 was also published by Pashinyan. The Kazan Principles were not signed. The Armenian authorities and diplomats lied to their already deceived people. It seems that Pashinyan himself did not know that no agreements had been concluded, which is clear from his previous statements. Apparently, the Armenian prime minister believed that if there is a text printed on paper, there must be a signature under it, even if it is not there.

By the way, after the Kazan meeting, Baku hosted a large-scale military parade in honor of the 20th anniversary of the restoration of Azerbaijan's independence. Speaking before the start of the parade, the President stated that the Armenian occupation is a temporary phenomenon and the territorial integrity of the country will be restored by any means. This is how he "signed" a toxic document proposed to the country affected by the occupation.

The Armenian leaders often deceived the Armenians. After the April battles, there were also a lot of things at the meetings in Vienna and St. Petersburg, and the then Foreign Minister Nalbandian assured that the Azerbaijani President had signed the agreements. But then he still had to admit that in fact, Ilham Aliyev had not signed anything.

We do not know what lesson our neighbors will learn from the documents thrown out by Pashinyan into the public space. By and large, it doesn't matter. History does not know the subjunctive mood. All these "if's" don't make sense. But it will be useful for the Armenian society to find out who is who. So that the past decades become a lesson for the neighbors.