What can you say about possible ratification of the protocols in the Turkish and Armenia parliaments? Is opening of borders between the countries is possible in near future?

Signing of the Armenian-Turkish protocols on normalization of bilateral relations can rightly be called a historic decision. Turkey  realized one of its most important foreign policy initiatives and secured a diplomatic victory. By signing the protocols Armenia seems to make a principal concessions primarily with regard to the "Armenian genocide"  processes of recognition of which can be considered "frozen".

If such a question is set aside, Armenia will likely be ready to make further concessions (concerning resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) in exchange for economic and political dividends. We believe the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement as well as proactive steps to establish full diplomatic relations between the countries will be brought to logical conclusion, despite the mixed reaction of the Armenian and Turkish public on this process.

Of course, one should not expect that normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations to be simple and quick. However, one can assume that the leadership of both countries will make every effort to ratify the protocols in the parliaments as huge work has been done in this regard and realization of national interests of both countries is involved.

What is Ukraine’s stance on settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?

Ukraine's official position implies recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and diplomatic support for this position. The Ukrainian side believes that the OSCE Minsk Group has the main role in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. A Ukrainian representative is also involved with the Minsk Group. Ukraine supports resolution of any conflict exclusively through peaceful means in accordance with international law.

We believe it is high time for Ukraine to intensify foreign policy activities in the South Caucasus subregion and form a basic document on foreign policy strategy in the South Caucasus. This document is projected to contain Ukraine’s proposals to develop new forms of cooperation with regional countries in politics, economy, security and options to involve Ukraine with important economic and energy projects in the subregion, as well as settlement of ethno-political conflicts.

Do you think Armenian diaspora’s negative attitude to possible ratification of the protocols can be viewed as a lack of interest in further development of Armenia?

The process of discussion of the Armenian-Turkish protocols in Armenia is not limited by national borders of this republic. Opinion of a large Armenian diaspora, though it does not decide Armenia’s domestic and foreign policies, is an important factor that no leader of the country can ignore. The Armenian community both within and outside Armenia  perceives normalization of relations with Turkey ambiguously. The Diaspora (not only Armenian) are often more radical towards complex national issues than their compatriots in the "historic homeland.”

Such a position is attributed lack of knowledge about realities back in homeland, current interests and a need to emphasize ethnicity, historical past and  traditions in a multi-ethnic environment in every possible way. This radicalism can also be attributed to life conditions in another country, where stereotypes of the past, fears and phobias, historical experience are stronger than in historical homeland.

Thus, Armenian diaspora’s negative attitude to Armenia-Turkey reconciliation can be regarded not as its disinterest in development of historical homeland, but in absence of a sense of current needs of Armenia.

The South Caucasus region is currently unstable for many reasons. Under what circumstances full cooperation between all countries in the region is possible?

Full cooperation among the South Caucasus countries in near future is unlikely, even fantastic. The current situation in the Caucasus is due to several trends. To overcome these trends and create conditions for effective cooperation among the countries is a very complex task. The point is that the South Caucasus still remains the epicenter where interests of leading countries (such as the U.S. and EU) and the Black Sea-Caspian region, in particular (Russia, Turkey, Iran) clash.

Thus, political influence can clearly be seen on the South Caucasian countries. Secondly, there is rivalry in the Caucasus between the two security systems: NATO (which seeks to integrate Georgia and Azerbaijan) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (which includes Armenia). In addition, there are a number of outstanding historical, ethnic, religious, territorial issues, which pose difficulties for relations among countries of the region. Full cooperation of the South Caucasus countries is impossible until a wide range of complex problems are resolved.

Media recently reported that Washington plans to appoint U.S. State Department diplomat Matthew Bryza a new ambassador to Azerbaijan. What effect can it have on relations between Azerbaijan and the United States?

As far as I know, the procedure of approval of Matthew Bryza as U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan was suspended. However, his appointment to this position would be justified step. Bryza has served as co-chair of OSCE Minsk Group from the United States for quite a long time. He is well aware of the problems in the Caucasus and all "pitfalls" for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is quite difficult to foresee new trends in the U.S.-Azerbaijani relations with appointment of a new U.S. ambassador.

The point is that the U.S. president and his new administration have pushed the issue of the Caucasus aside due to the global economic crisis focusing on domestic economic issues and foreign policy objectives such as to restart relations with Russia. The Barack Obama administration has not yet formed the concept of U.S. foreign policy in the Caucasus. It is difficult to predict impact of a U.S. ambassador to relations with Azerbaijan or any other South Caucasian country till he/she is appointed.

Do you believe Turkey can become a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk? If so, how this may impact the settlement of the Karabakh conflict?

Despite the fact that the international community links settlement of the Karabakh conflict exclusively with efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group, conflict resolution mechanism and MG participants have been changed in past years. Russia and Turkey, leading regional players, have intensified efforts. Turkey has even made an initiative to establish stability in the South Caucasus region and solve the regional conflicts, which comprises basis of "Platform of Stability and Security in the Caucasus.”

According to this document, Turkey today pursues a policy of rapprochement with Armenia initiating negotiations on Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. So, Turkey, having no relation to the OSCE Minsk Group, today plays a role of chief mediator in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. I believe  Turkish diplomacy does not aim at accession to the Minsk Group since it can realize its foreign policy plans in the Caucasus beyond the OSCE.

Moreover,  Turkey will not be able to obtain membership in the Minsk Group at least  because of two reasons: Armenia considers Turkey a party that supports Azerbaijan's position in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Russia will not back Turkey’s accession to the OSCE MG.

T. Teymur
Day.Az