Today.Az » Politics » Alexei Vlasov: "I am more likely a careful pessimist than an optimist in the issue of the Karabakh resolution"
24 May 2008 [12:49] - Today.Az
Day.Az interview with Alexei Vlasov, Russian political scientist, director general of the information-analytical center for research of sociopolitical processes in the post-Soviet area.
- Do you share the opinion of the Russian leadership that the unilateral recognition of Kosovo's independence will complicate the solution of conflicts on the post-Soviet area, as it will become a precedent for other unrecognized countries? I mean primarily Nagorno Karabakh.
- I do not think that the resolution of this conflict will depend on the adopted resolution on Kosovo as historically this conflict had a bit different structure. And furthermore, the Kosovo precedent may affect more Europe than the so-called "frozen conflicts" in the post-Soviet area.
It is clear even without Kosovo that Abkhazia remains problem for Georgia and Nagorno Karabakh is a factor, isolating Azerbaijan and Armenia and nothing will change much in this sense.
Therefore, the Kosovo precedent is more likely a break of all existing norms and traditions of the international law, which formed in period following the World War Second, we will feel the geopolitical consequences for long. But I would not say that this may cardinally influence the resolution or deterioration of the situation around Nagorno Karabakh.
- Russia's mediatory role in the resolution of regional conflicts, which mainly occur in the territory of Georgia is negatively assessed in the Caucasus. The Russian leadership has once issued Russian passports to Abkhazs and now openly uses it as a cause for interference with possible new Georgian-Abkhaz war to defend "its compatriots" or hints on possible annexion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Don't you think that such policy not peace-keeping but deteriorates the conflict even more?
- I think no annexation is possible in this case. I think a complicated game is conducted around Abkhazia and South Ossetia, being connected with the counteraction between Georgia and Russia.
Several factors have appeared here if speaking about Abkhazia. These are Abkhazs' objective striving for creation of an independent country and West's influence on Georgia, which is gradually becoming the outpost of the US influence in the South Caucasus, unlike Azerbaijan, which in this sense having close contacts with the West, conducts a multi-directional and balanced policy, I think.
And the third factor is a hidden conflict between Russia and the West in a struggle for the post-Soviet area, including on the issue of the South Caucasus and the problem of unrecognized states.
If these factors are brought together, we will see that in fact there is no direct counteraction between Russia and Georgia, there is a complex geopolitical game, involving not two or three subjects, but several sides. Therefore, it is difficult to find the common ground in the Abkhaz, South Ossetia and Transdniestria conflicts.
But you have singled out Nagorno Karabakh, as here I do not feel any counteraction between Russia and the West. This is the problem of bilateral relations, of Armenia and Azerbaijan. When these countries find common grounds on Nagorno Karabakh conflicts, the serious breakthrough would be possible. But at present we see the results of the mediatory efforts since 1994. They have no results.
- You have used the term "outpost" speaking about the relations of Georgia with the West. In our region this term was previously applied by chairman of Russian State Du,a B.Gryzlov to Armenia, whom the speaker called "the outpost of Russia in the South Caucasus. Don't you think such statement of a high-ranking representative of the country which is, undoubtedly, the leading mediator in the Karabakh conflict settlement, undermine its neutralize?
- (Laughing) You know, being a Russian political scientist, I have already got used to that primarily it is necessary to treat seriously the announcements of senior political leadership: Previously it was President and not there are two of them-President and Prime Minister.
This is because for example when Luzhkov states his position on Sevastopol, it is clear that this is his position of a politician and a patriot (by the way, I mostly agree with all he says). But this is not Russia's position and this does not reflect position of the senior officials.
- A new president, who is considered to succeed to the previous one, was inaugurated in Armenia. The same occurred in Russia. In October of this year the elections will be held in Azerbaijan as well. Do you hear any changes in the talks on Karabakh following the completion of this year of elections?
- First of all, according to all my forecasts, the outcome of elections is quite predictable in Azerbaijan.
Indeed, despite the replacement of the President in Armenia, the policy, conducted by Kocharyan's team insite the Armenian elite, will also remain changeless. It is possible to say about succession of powers in Russia, as well. The replacement of the first figure on the political Olymp will also not change two much in the first 1.5-2 years, which means that there positions, Putin fixed lately, which will successively affect the external political course of Medvedev. Perhaps, only the rhetorics will change a bit.
Now what we have? As for the Karabakh resolution I am more a careful pessimist than an optimist, as, if three components are the same, any real achievements can not be expected in such case without the due ground. And this is not because of Russia's egoism. This is because neither of the countries has an exact plan of resolution, though it was worked out in the 1990s: this is primarily, liberation of the seven regions of Azerbaijan. As I understand no achievements should be expected for the next 1-1.5 years.
/Day.Az/
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