Diaspora has been left out of Armenia’s plans: it turns out that this is possible.

The Prime Minister of Armenia proclaimed the Fourth Republic. He defined the new historical stage for the Armenian state based on a change in the very paradigm of state policy and the principles of “real Armenia.” The Fourth Republic is Armenia, freed from illusions and developing its statehood on the basis of an ideology built not on hatred and historical madness, but on reality and concern for the future. According to the concept of the Fourth Republic, as Nikol Pashinyan himself has stated, there will be no place for the “Karabakh movement” and claims against neighbors.

The so?called Third Republic was built on these principles, making its statehood dependent on the success of the “miatsum.” Given the failure of the “miatsum,” it can be safely said that the Third Republic ceased to exist after Azerbaijan regained full sovereignty over all its internationally recognized territories. The principle that served as the foundation for the proclamation of Armenian statehood (according to the Declaration of Independence) no longer exists. This means that the previous concept no longer exists either, which makes it necessary to abandon past fatal mistakes even at the institutional level.

The opposition has already denounced the prime minister and his team, pointing out that the whole world has recognized the Third Republic, with all its rotten core and shaky foundations—that is, with its claims to Azerbaijani lands. But all of this is meaningless, because the five?year programme of the government formed by Pashinyan’s party will be based on a new ideology. Specifically, on the ideology of “real Armenia” within its internationally recognised borders, without claims to foreign territories, and without the corrupting influence of the church on state policy. And it is in this form that the world will recognise Armenia and work with it.

Moreover, the new concept will not include the harmful influence of the diaspora. This fact greatly unsettles and irritates the “Spurk” and its figures. The diaspora effectively governed Armenia for a hundred years. Even during the Soviet era, decisions regarding the Armenian SSR were made with the participation of and taking into account the interests of the “spurk.” This was considered normal. The diaspora also played a role in shaping the Karabakh conflict; it was at the origins of each of its stages and formed the ideological foundation for ethnic cleansing and bloodshed. The diaspora also led the so?called Third Republic and held all the levers of power. The first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, under whose leadership ethnic cleansing of Azerbaijanis, genocide, and occupation took place, was also from the diaspora. During the First Karabakh War, the “spurk” supplied weapons and mercenaries to the conflict zone, financed terrorist gangs and punitive operations against the civilian population, and supported the separatist regime and the occupying forces.

Armenia was under the full control of the diaspora during the rule of the Karabakh clan. The Karabakh criminals who seized power in the country crouched and did push?ups on orders from Marseille, Moscow, or California. In exchange for their obedience, the foreign Armenian community lent significant sums to Yerevan, which, however, did not go towards Armenia’s development but ended up in the pockets of the presidents of the Republic of Armenia and the leaders of the separatist regime.

After coming to power, Nikol Pashinyan began to move away from this scheme. In January 2019, as part of the government optimization process, the Ministry of Diaspora was closed. A big stir arose in the “spurk.” At that time, the diaspora first sensed that they were beginning to lose control over what was effectively their brainchild — the Republic of Armenia.

Today, the opposition reproaches Pashinyan for breaking with the “spurk,” calling this the main cause of the disaster that befell Armenian aspirations in 2020. Pashinyan distanced himself from the diaspora, quarreled with its leaders, and closed the channels through which it could prevent Azerbaijan from liberating its territories, revanchists claim.

Over the six post?war years, relations deteriorated completely. Pashinyan never once turned to the “spurk” for help or assistance, which allowed him to avoid becoming dependent on the Armenian diaspora. The leaders of the “spurk” cannot get close to Yerevan and interfere in Armenia’s affairs, no matter how hard they try. No one ever thought it was possible to break free from the diaspora’s “clutch.” But it turned out that you just need to grow up.

Recently, in parliament, the ruling party dealt another “blow” to the diaspora. Speaking at a meeting, Arman Yegoyan, a deputy from the Civil Contract, asked: “Who are Aram Hamparian and Gaspard Karampetyan?” He didn’t expect an answer with explanations of their biographies and achievements. He said it in the context of Armenia’s non?recognition of the authority of these figures. They are nobody.

It should be recalled that Ambaryan is the head of ANCA — the Armenian National Committee of America. This is the very provocative organization that promotes anti?Azerbaijani resolutions in Congress and actively carries out anti?Azerbaijani activities in the United States. What drives the American Armenian community to spend money on buying lobbying and bribing officials is not the interests of Armenia, but the fear of losing influence and opportunities due to the decline of the anti?Turkish and anti?Azerbaijani agenda in the United States. For nearly a hundred years, the Armenian community has benefited from Turkophobia and the myth of the “genocide,” and the loss of these levers of influence due to Yerevan’s “betrayal” unsettles the same Ambaryan. After the Prime Minister of Armenia questioned the myth of the “Armenian genocide,” he became the main target of ANCA’s hatred.Kaspar Karampetyan is the director of the “Office for the Armenian Cause in Brussels,” or the “European?Armenian Federation for Justice and Democracy.” A fraudster, a corrupt official, a mobster, a financier of the Armenian lobby in the European Parliament, and an organizer of fundraising for the separatists of Karabakh. He is known as one of the founders of the “mafia?lobby” mechanism. Karampetyan’s capital is generated through the illegal smuggling of diamonds. Karampetyan’s name was mentioned in a corruption scandal in the EP related to Eva Kaili.

Ambaryan and Karampetyan themselves are well?known figures burdened with a rich, shady biography. But for Armenia, they are nobody.

Murad Papazyan, co?chair of the Coordination Council of Armenian Organizations of France (CCAF) and a member of the Bureau of the Dashnaktsutyun party, was offended on behalf of his colleagues. His reaction to the State Duma deputy’s “neglect” of the diaspora factor appeared in the Armenian media. He stated that the Pashinyan government is “deliberately trying to devalue the diaspora, underestimate its usefulness, and ultimately defend the absurd thesis that a stronger diaspora means a weaker Armenia.”

Papazyan’s reaction was driven not so much by resentment on behalf of Ambaryan and Karampetyan as by concern for himself.

Pashinyan’s relations with the Dashnaks never really got off to a good start, and after Armenia’s defeat in the war, they deteriorated completely. While the prime minister still tolerated the local Dashnaks, representatives of the Dashnaktsutyun from the diaspora were barred from entering Armenia. For example, in 2025, Aslanyan, a member of the ARF, was not allowed into Armenia from the Netherlands. And in 2022, Papazyan himself was not permitted to enter. Macron repeatedly tried to reconcile Pashinyan with Papazyan. The last such attempt was made in February of this year, during the ceremony to rebury an Armenian participant in the Resistance in the Panthéon. However, Macron’s mediation did not help.

In April, a new building of the Armenian embassy was opened in Paris. The RA government removed well?known figures from the list — Aru Toranian, Murad Papazyan, Hovhannes Gevorkyan, and Krikor Khachatryan. European diaspora organizations were terribly outraged. CCAF stated that the Armenian embassy represents the entire Armenian people, not just the country. This was a very strange and amusing thesis, but it stemmed from an old habit. “Spurk” itself did not consider Armenia a state in the full sense of the word: not only the embassy, but also this entity itself was seen by the diaspora as its own property.

Currently, the diaspora cannot do anything about Pashinyan. The hope for elections did not materialize, as the foreign Armenian community was not granted the right to vote. Specifically, the citizens of the Republic of Armenia living in the diaspora formed the core of the electorate of the revanchist opposition. Pashinyan has cut off the diaspora leaders’ access to Armenia and is trying to have nothing to do with it. Today’s Yerevan does not take part in the anti?Azerbaijani and anti?Turkish endeavors of the “spurka” and does not join initiatives and demands aimed at destroying the peace process in the South Caucasus. The diaspora does not know how to approach the issue. She buys resolutions in Congress, the European Parliament, and PACE, but they mean nothing because the initiative does not come from the Republic of Armenia itself. The Republic of Armenia itself does not initiate resolutions against Azerbaijan, which makes the efforts of the Armenian diaspora insignificant from a legal standpoint. Moreover, such initiatives by the diaspora are viewed with caution in world capitals because they hinder the peace process between Baku and Yerevan.

The diaspora is making efforts to undermine peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as to nullify the process of normalizing relations between the “homeland of the ancestors” and Turkey. It is no coincidence that President Erdo?an previously accused the Armenian diaspora in France and the United States of obstructing his vision for normalizing relations, calling on the Armenian government to neutralize their influence.

This is exactly what the government of Nikol Pashinyan is doing. And not because Erdo?an said so, but because it is necessary for Armenia itself. If it wants to move forward in the future not as an appendage and tool of world Armenianism, but as a real state. The current government of the republic has chosen the second option. Although Armenia is a product of the “spurka” and the criminal church, Yerevan has severed this umbilical cord. It’s time for a new and independent life, in which prospects have finally emerged.