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When Iran first voiced its opposition to the Zangezur
corridor, Yerevan was very pleased. On their own, the Armenian authorities were
unable to stand up to Baku, especially given the fact that the construction of
the road was stipulated in the Trilateral Statement of November 10, 2020, which
was, in fact, an act of capitulation.
If Armenia had been able to look ahead, it would not have rejoiced at the appearance of an ally, but would have sought to neutralize further attempts at interference. But our neighbors have never been able to look ahead, so they hastened to hide behind Tehran’s back, so they could calmly watch Azerbaijan’s plans fall apart. We don’t even rule out the possibility that the ally didn’t just drop out of the sky; its appearance on the scene was the result of the Armenian side’s own actions. Armenia had no way to respond to the crushing military defeat; the only effective tool in its hands was the communication with Nakhchivan, which is very important for Azerbaijan. And Yerevan hoped to manipulate this issue for as long as possible.
Concerns about the project’s alleged extraterritoriality and
the threats of border changes in the region were frankly far?fetched and unfounded
from the outset. The issue was about restoring a previously existing route, and
it was initially supposed to be guarded by Russian border guards, who were
already stationed in Megri and posed no “threats” to Iran. The American factor
only entered the discussion in August of last year, and before that, for five
years, Iran protested against a project that did not concern it, thereby
allowing Armenia to avoid fulfilling its obligations. While Yerevan maintained
its stance, Iran took over the southern branch of the Middle Corridor, leaving
Armenia with nothing, yet it still continued to tragically believe that its
neighbor had made such a “sacrifice” for its sake.
If our Armenian neighbors were more sovereign, if they knew
how to act independently and do without guardians, they would probably open
their eyes wider and see that they are now living in completely different
realities. A proper analysis of the situation should have suggested that Baku
would still achieve its goal, no matter how broad the Iranian or any other back
that Yerevan was hiding behind might be. Baku, having overcome resistance,
secured the inclusion of the road to Nakhchivan in the Trilateral Statement not
in order to abandon the project as soon as someone furrowed their brows in a
threatening manner.
Everything changed when the American factor entered the picture — or, more precisely, when Azerbaijan diplomatically brought it into the project. No one expected this. Americans are people of action, and today the necessary agreements for launching the project have already been signed, and the relevant structures have been established. Yerevan could not refuse Washington. They would not have listened to the tales about “threats to sovereignty” and the like, which had previously been voiced in Farsi and had warmed the Armenian soul. The TRIPP agreement is the first serious document signed with the United States in the entire history of Armenia’s independence. Unexpectedly for itself, it became part of a big game and should have been dancing with joy. However, this joy is overshadowed by the fact that the country has found itself caught between a rock and a hard place.
Let us reiterate: from the very beginning, Yerevan should
not have allowed Iran to cross its “red lines.” The country’s internal affairs
are the most significant red line. Iran crossed it with the permission and
active participation of the Armenian side. Lacking the skills in international
relations and experience in serious diplomacy, Yerevan opened the doors to
foreign interests wide open, and it will now be very difficult to close them.
Recently, Sargis Khandanyan, a member of the ruling Civil
Contract faction, told journalists that there is mutual understanding between
Armenia and Iran regarding the TRIPP program. The deputy stressed that the
construction of the railway does not depend on the relations between Iran and
the United States. “The issue of the railway is on the agenda. At the moment,
the location and its feasibility are being studied, and once the research and
technical checks are completed, construction will begin. I don’t see any
political obstacles here,” Khandanyan naively stated.
The next day, a response came from Iran. Iranian General
Rahim Safavi stated that “contrary to the Armenian side’s claims, we did not
reach any preliminary agreements with Armenia on the TRIPP project.” There is
no real mutual understanding or common positions on this issue. The general
said that Iran has conveyed its “red lines” to Yerevan, and the project, in its
current format, poses a threat to the Iranian side.
In Armenia, this statement, although unofficial, was met
with concern. At a parliamentary session on Friday, Khandanyan was quick to
reassure the Iranian side. “The TRIPP project is purely an infrastructure
project, not a territory or a military base. (...) There will be no presence of
security forces from any other state. All security functions are vested in the
Republic of Armenia,” he said.
This indirect dialogue between Yerevan and Tehran will
continue. Because in the past six years, the latter has grown accustomed to
believing that the road to Nakhchivan somehow concerns him. The owner of the
territory — Armenia — only perpetuated this illusion, thinking it had hit the
jackpot.It’s easy to understand Iran’s reluctance to see Americans on its
border. But let’s not forget that the American factor only entered the project
in August 2025; before that, the rhetoric was the same — it’s just that now the
United States is also included in it. Previously, the discussion centered on
“certain countries” (read: Azerbaijan), which supposedly wanted to connect with
Nakhchivan and then with Turkey, thereby destroying the Armenian border and
depriving Iran of access to the north. This was said not only by IRGC generals
but also by representatives of the official authorities. Deliberately far?fetched and contrived
arguments literally filled the airwaves.
Armenia itself was supposed to refute these speculations,
since the road would run through its territory. Any sovereign state would try
to immediately put an end to discussions and make it clear that it will not
allow interference in its affairs. It is no coincidence that Azerbaijan always
reacts harshly to any attempts by anyone to interfere in its own affairs. Some
people may sometimes find this reaction excessive, but it is fully justified.
If a country allows interference once, whether voluntarily or under pressure,
it will have to do so again in the future. This is especially true for smaller
countries. It can be difficult for them to defend their sovereignty and political
independence. Azerbaijan managed to achieve this after going through a long and
difficult path, but today no one dares to tell it whom to befriend, whom to
cooperate with, or how to implement projects. Armenia, on the other hand, has
no such protection. Its internal affairs have always been controlled by
external actors. Using the example of the Zangezur corridor, we can see that
Yerevan is not recognized as having the right to make decisions. And the only
one to blame for this is Yerevan itself.
If Armenia weren’t so stubborn, the road would already be operational. Now she will have to navigate between two sworn enemies — the United States and Iran. And there’s also the problem with Russia, which has a concessionary right to manage the Armenian railways. This right is enshrined in an interstate agreement, which must be taken into account. At first, Pashinyan threatened to revoke the Russian Railways’ license, file a lawsuit, and take the matter to arbitration, but today he has toned down his tone, proposing compromise options. And Russia expects that, if things continue this way, by the end of the year Yerevan will invite it to join TRIPP.
Armenia was very reluctant to grant Azerbaijan the right to
unimpeded passage through Meghri; it complained everywhere, spoke of an
encroachment on its integrity and sovereign rights, and sought allies and
sympathizers. But all that was at stake was the passage of goods from one part
of Azerbaijan to another without customs control. We personally don’t understand
how this could threaten Armenia’s sovereignty and integrity. However, we do
understand that the Armenian side has encountered so many problems related to
the project that it has no time to deal with the content of Azerbaijani goods
right now. In the fight against imagined threats, she received a project that
would belong to her only for a quarter. Let us recall that in January, Ararat
Mirzoyan and Marco Rubio signed a document providing for the establishment of
the TRIPP Development Company. The United States will own 74 percent of the
shares in the company, and Armenia will own 26 percent.
If Armenia were to implement the 9th point of the Trilateral
Statement of November 10 without delay, it would be the full owner of the road.
Because Azerbaijan didn’t claim anything except for the unhindered and safe
movement of its trains from point A to point B. Was that really so much?
Armenia won’t be able to abandon TRIPP without damaging its
relations with the US. The current administration is very serious about
entering this region and won’t give up the opportunity that has arisen. As the
leaks in the media and social networks show, Iran also has no intention of
backing down on this issue. Having identified a weak point in Armenia, he is
now directing all his “red lines” at it, and statements from the IRGC will be
made more than once. Pashinyan and his team should prepare themselves. Armenia
itself let this genie out of the bottle. Only it didn’t come out to fulfill its
wishes, but quite the opposite.
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