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On August 12, according to the decision taken at the Caspian
summit in 2022, the next meeting of the heads of the five states of the Caspian
region is to be held in Tehran.
Given the difficult military and political situation in the
region, today no one can say with absolute certainty that the summit in Tehran
will take place. However, there is a solution, and the parties are preparing
for the meeting, expecting Iran to fulfill its promise - to ratify the
Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, which has been suffering for
many years and was adopted in 2018. Tehran promised to do this, and President
Masoud Peseshkian kept his word, approving the document ahead of the summit and
sending it to Parliament for ratification.
This was announced to journalists the other day by the press
secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Esmail Bagai. According to him,
the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea has been sent to
Parliament for ratification. "The ratification of this document will pave
the way for the creation of a clear legal framework between the Caspian
littoral states and prevent possible abuses that may arise in the absence of
such a framework, especially by entities outside the region," IRNA quoted
Bagai as saying.
He said that the draft law on the ratification of this
convention had been approved as a matter of urgency, and the necessary
consultations had been held between the Government and specialized
parliamentary committees. "We hope that the process of its final
ratification in parliament will be completed as soon as possible," said a
spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry.
This news was not widely reported in the media of the
Caspian littoral states, although Peseshkian and the government took a really
very important step. Apparently, few people believe that the bill will receive
support. In addition, it must be borne in mind that the religious authorities
have the last word in this country. It is possible that the summit in Tehran
will again be held in an atmosphere of uncertainty, when Iran has been
hindering the entry into force of the Convention for eight years. For many
years, Tehran was not alone in this matter - Turkmenistan also had its own view
on the issue. Russia and Kazakhstan did not interfere much, having already
decided everything between themselves, and Baku had to fight virtually alone
for a long time. He could not do nothing, because both neighbors were attacking
his interests.
However, the Caspian Convention, which is also called the
Constitution of the Caspian Sea, dated August 2018, was ratified by Ashgabat in
December of the same year. And only Tehran remained a brake on the entry of
coastal countries into their legal rights.
Peseshkian promised to ratify the document before the
summit. There's just over a week left. The peculiarity of the current summit is
that it coincides with the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the Tehran
Convention on the Caspian Sea (August 12, 2006). And Tehran is determined to
hold it, despite the complexity of the situation.
We will see what the parliament's decision will be. In any case, there are no encouraging signals yet. On the contrary, immediately after Pezeshkian's decision became known, he and his team were criticized by various figures who were outraged that Iran was "making concessions."
Dr. Mir Mehrdad Mirsanjari, an associate professor at the
university and a researcher in the field of culture and geopolitics, presented an
extensive article in which he tried to prove why Iran does not benefit from
this ratification. He compared the Convention signed in 2018 with the Treaty of
Turkmanchay and stated that it was unacceptable for Iran to retain one fifth of
the share, while it once owned half.
The associate professor is outraged that the documents
related to the convention officially use "the names of wild, anti-Iranian
and aggressive Caspian peoples instead of the correct names." Iran
considers the "Mazandaran" and sometimes "Khazar" Sea to be
the "correct" name for the sea washing the shores of five sovereign
states. The name comes from the historical province of Mazandaran, which is
located on the southern coast of the reservoir within Iran. If we follow this
logic, then the Caspian Sea may be called the Salyan, Absheron or Lankaran
Seas. Why not?
Associate Professor Mirsanjari also dislikes the clauses of
the Convention allowing countries to build artificial islands, underwater
cables and pipelines in their sector. He is confident that these projects are
"geopolitically counterproductive to Iran's interests, security and
national interests." He believes that the Iranian side should insist on
applying the principle of joint exploitation of the entire Caspian Sea (?), and
even a 20 percent share is a "cloying illusion" according to which
Iran's "indisputable right should be reduced from half to one fifth."
Iranian political scientist Shuaib Bahman is another expert who believes that Iran should not ratify the Convention. He dismisses all the arguments of the authorities, considering the ratification to be "Iran's cession of territorial rights in the Caspian Sea." Moreover, the political scientist stated, "the ratification of this document will not only not help eliminate external threats, but will also damage the energy strategies of Iran and Russia, contributing to the export of energy resources of regional rivals to Europe." Instead of ratification, the authorities should protect Iran's historical rights. The Iranian political scientist is particularly afraid of article 14, which permits the laying of energy pipelines along the bottom of the Caspian Sea. From the expert's point of view, the application of such a clause may open the way for the direct transfer of oil and gas from the Eastern Caspian countries to the European market and affect some of Iran's geopolitical and transit advantages.
International relations expert Dariush Safarnejad also
believes that the document should be returned to the government immediately. First,
he said in a media commentary, it is necessary to consolidate Iran's rights in
official documents, and then ratify the Convention, otherwise the other four
countries will then decide to "influence the security, political and
geopolitical processes in the Caspian region." In his opinion, any
decision regarding the legal regime of the Caspian Sea should be made
"solely on the basis of Iran's national interests and historical
rights."
When Iranian experts claim certain special historical rights
of Iran to the Caspian Sea, they are referring to both the nebulous antiquity
and the treaties signed between the USSR and Persia in 1921 and 1940. Opponents
of the Convention in Iran consider the rejection of a treaty signed with a
non-existent empire to be a huge drawback of the current agreements. They claim
that these agreements cannot be cancelled without creating a "replacement
with the same legal basis."
It is impossible to understand the logic of Pezeshkian's
opponents. It is simply missing. These circles adhere to agreements signed on a
bilateral basis, while for thirty-five years there have been not two, but five
sovereign states around the Caspian Sea that have full rights to maritime borders.
And the fact that Iran has the shortest coastline is not a problem for
Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan. The arguments about a certain 50 percent share of
Iran in the Caspian Sea are also incorrect. Iranian experts who give this
figure cannot specify the principle by which the USSR and Persia divided the
sea in half. The same short coastline did not include half of the reservoir in
any way.
As can be learned from open sources, the Soviet-Persian
treaty of 1921 did not contain provisions on the division of the Caspian Sea in
percentage terms and did not assign Iran 50 percent of the water area. The
treaty established the right of navigation only for Soviet and Iranian vessels.
This provision is fully consistent with the requirements of the current Convention.
Only now, not two, but five states have the exclusive right of navigation in
the Caspian Sea.
The monopoly right to the Caspian Sea was held by tsarist
Russia in accordance with the Gulistan and Turkmanchay treaties. The 1921
treaty abolished this monopoly. The sea was declared common and there was no
talk of any division of shares.
All the years after the collapse of the USSR and before the
signing of the Caspian Convention in 2018, the Iranian side stubbornly
maintained that the only legitimate regulatory documents in the Caspian Sea
were the two treaties signed with Persia. By doing this, Iran was trying to
consolidate the idea of its exclusive rights among its neighbors in the
reservoir, which would have to be taken into account in the future division.
Although there was no concept of maritime borders in the
treaties of 1921 and 1940, Iran did not dare to venture into Soviet territory
and make claims to Moscow when offshore oil exploration and production began in
Azerbaijan. The median line, which defines the sectoral division between the
five countries according to the Convention, was drawn back in Soviet times to
fix the maritime administrative borders of the Union republics. The Iranian
side has never had any rights in the other four sectors outlined by this rule.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan was the master of its sector in Soviet times.
The fact that Russia declared itself the legal successor of
the USSR does not mean anything for the issue of the status of the Caspian Sea.
Therefore, Iran cannot appeal to the treaties of a century ago, claiming that
they continue to work until the entry into force of the Convention. The rights
of the USSR in the Caspian Sea after the collapse of the Union were
automatically distributed among the coastal countries.
Russia and Kazakhstan quickly came to an agreement. By and
large, the uncertainty over the status issue was beneficial to Russia, as it
hindered Central Asia's ability to reach the West. In the old days, Kazakhstan
did not think about any underwater communications, and did not participate in
the clashes between Baku and Tehran. The fact that the Convention on the Legal
Status of the Caspian Sea was finally adopted is primarily due to Azerbaijani
diplomacy.
Iran and Russia were united in opposing the plans to lay
underwater communications. And the latter, I think, played an important role in
shaping Tehran's position.
Unfortunately, Azerbaijan alone had to clean up all this. In
1998, Iran tried to sign an agreement with Western companies on deposits in the
Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea. In July 2001, an Iranian warship and a
combat aircraft entered the territorial waters and airspace of Azerbaijan and
demanded that the Geophysicist-3 research vessel stop geophysical exploration
at the Alov oil field in the Caspian Sea, arguing that the borders were
allegedly undefined. After the Turkish fighters appeared in the air, the
intruders retreated. However, work on the site has not resumed so as not to
aggravate the international situation.
The situation has changed a lot over the years. Views on the
region, Azerbaijan's place in it, and the level of its cooperation with Central
Asian countries have changed, which means a lot in the context of resolving
issues in the Caspian Sea area. Moscow's position is also not the same as it
was twenty years ago. Today, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explicitly
states what Russia expects from Iran. Russia expects Iran to ratify the
Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea before the next summit of the
Caspian littoral states. That is, until August 12, 2026. "Only the Islamic
Republic of Iran is in line... We very much look forward to Tehran's
ratification of this convention," Lavrov said earlier.
In January 2021, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan agreed on the disputed
Dostlug field, located on the border of the two sectors. Turkmenistan has
expressed interest in building the Trans-Caspian pipeline, which it had
previously tried to stay away from. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have started the
Trans-Caspian high-voltage underwater cable project. And at the end of last
week, our countries began laying the Trans-Caspian fiber-optic communication
line.
In other words, life goes on regardless of the entry into
force or non-entry into force of the Convention on the Legal Status of the
Caspian Sea, signed in August 2018. So August 12 will be the moment of truth
not for the sea, but for Tehran.
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